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Abstract:  
We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision-making 
in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of appropriate incentives for potential 
tort-feasors to exert care, when evidence about care is imperfect and may be 
distorted by the parties. Efficiency is shown to be consistent with courts adjudicating 
on the basis of  the preponderance of evidence standard of proof together with 
common law exclusionary rules. Inefficient equilibria may nevertheless also arise 
under these rules. Directing courts as to the assignment of the burden of proof is then 
useful as a coordination device. Alternatively, burden of proof guidelines are 
unnecessary if courts are allowed a more active or inquisitorial role, by contrast with 
that of passive adjudicator.  
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1 Introduction
Court decision-making is constrained by various rules and standards. In
common law, exclusionary rules discard as inadmissible apparently relevant
evidence. This includes evidence of similar facts (e.g., whether the defen-
dant was previously involved in a similar case), evidence of character or of
a reputation for behaving negligently or diligently, or evidence purporting
to show that defendants of a particular type tend to behave in a particular
way. In civil litigation, courts must decide on the basis of a preponderance
of evidence, a standard of proof requirement. The preponderance standard
means that a claim is deemed proved if, upon the evidence, it is more likely
true than not true. There are also situations where the law imposes on courts
the burden of proof assignment. For instance, rather than having the plain-
ti¤ bear the burden as is usually the case, statute law or jurisprudence may
require that the defendant prove that he did not cause harm or did not act
negligently. In some cases, burden of proof requirements may also refer to the
type of evidence needed for proof. Finally, there are legal traditions where
the court is allowed a more active or inquisitorial role, by contrast with that
of passive adjudicator in the purely adversarial procedure of common law.
We develop a model of tort litigation where the above legal principles and
procedures can be analyzed on e¢ ciency grounds.
To illustrate, consider a medical liability case. The plainti¤ claims that
he su¤ered harm due to negligent oversight by his physician. Suppose all
relevant evidence always becomes available to the court. The evidence may
nevertheless be highly imperfect, i.e., the court faces a risk of error whether it
rules in favor of the patient or the physician. An important issue is therefore
the degree of certaintyor standard of proof required to reach a decision.
Demougin and Fluet (2006) show that the preponderance standard has a
remarkable property. If courts rule on the issue of negligence on a prepon-
derance of evidence, there will be maximum ex ante incentives for physicians
to act nonnegligently. The argument has a caveat: in applying the stan-
dard, courts must abide by exclusionary rules. Evidence pertaining to a
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propensityfor the defendant to act a certain way should be discarded as
inadmissible. There is therefore an e¢ ciency justication for the standard of
proof and exclusionary rules in common law.1
The above result was derived under the assumption that evidence exoge-
nously becomes available to the court. This paper extends the analysis to
the case where veriable evidence initially rests with the parties, who may
attempt to shade the evidence. This introduces additional di¢ culties such
as the weight that should be given to a testimony or the appropriate inter-
pretation of the evidence submitted. If evidence can be manipulated, is a
preponderance of evidence still the appropriate standard? And what does a
preponderance mean?
The issue is straightforward if both litigants are known to have access
to all veriable evidence and if submission costs are small compared to the
stakes. As evidence will necessarily favor one party or the other, one of
the interested partywill nd it useful to disclose it (Milgrom and Roberts,
1986). Equivalently, if all relevant evidence is not disclosed, a Bayesian judge
or jury will draw the appropriate inferences. However, unraveling does not
follow if the parties do not always have access to all the evidence and may be
unequally informed. Shavell (1989) and Shin (1994, 1998) showed that the
parties may then be successful in not revealing facts harmful to their case.
The courts problem is then to interpret partial and possibly distorted
information. Should this a¤ect the standard of proof and exclusionary rules
described above? If plainti¤s in medical liability cases are known to be able on
average to present only basic evidence, should the standard of proof they must
meet be lower? Should some weight now be given to the physiciansgeneral
propensity to act negligently? We show that, even though the parties can
manipulate the submitted evidence and may be unequally informed, courts
should abide by exactly the same rules of proof as above.
We assume that, in applying these rules, courts are sophisticated decision-
1Schrag and Scotchmer (1994) analyzed the deterrence justication for the dismissal of
character evidence in criminal trials. Sanchirico (2001b) provides an in-depth discussion.
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makers, i.e., they understand the partiesstrategic incentives. As a result,
they interpret limited evidence in a particular light. Suppose the plainti¤
submits mixed evidence. By this we mean evidence which, under the
preponderance standard, is consistent with either a decision for the plainti¤
or against him, should additional evidence be forthcoming. Then it may be
that, if the defendant does not come forward with countervailing evidence,
the court will form a presumption against him. Such presumptions arise
spontaneously, so to speak, in the manner courts interpret evidence under
the preponderance standard.
So far, the implication seems to be that standard of proof and exclusionary
rules are the only judicial tools needed to e¢ ciently direct court decision-
making, i.e., these principles are su¢ cient if the objective of tort law is to
provide potential tort-feasors with the best ex ante incentives to exert care.
There is nevertheless a sense in which the foregoing result does not necessarily
follow. While an e¢ cient equilibrium exists when courts operate under the
appropriate standard of proof and exclusionary rules, other equilibria may
exist as well under the same set of rules.
To see this, suppose again the victim most likely has access to only limited
evidence. Assume that e¢ ciency requires that the defendant be held liable
given this evidence on its own. If in equilibrium the court holds a presumption
against the defendant when this evidence is the only one submitted, then the
victim will sue on the basis of this evidence alone. Moreover, the court
will be justied, under the preponderance standard, to nd that there was
negligence. The reason is that, owing to the presumption against him, the
defendant would most likely have come forward with additional evidence if it
was in his favor. The fact that he did not therefore justies the presumption.
Call this equilibrium A, which by assumption here is the e¢ cient one.
Now, consider another possibility. In equilibrium B, the court does not
nd the defendant liable under the limited evidence alone. Hence, the victim
does not sue on this basis alone. If he did, the defendant would have no
incentive to come forward with additional costly evidence since he (correctly)
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expects the plainti¤to fail. Thus, the court will interpret the limited evidence
di¤erently than in equilibrium A, because the defendants strategic incentives
are di¤erent. As a result, the court concludes that the plainti¤s evidence
does not meet the standard of proof, i.e., that negligence has not been shown
to be more likely than due care.
In circumstances such as these, imposing on courts the burden of proof
assignment helps select the better equilibrium. In the example, courts should
be directed to put the burden of proof on the defendant. The purpose is to co-
ordinate parties and courts on the good equilibrium, making sure that victims
come forward even if it they have limited evidence. Such guidelines e.g.,
through statute law or jurisprudence from higher courts are often observed.
Although we formulated the example in terms of the need to put the burden
of proof on the defendant, the reverse problem can also arise where courts
are too lenient with plainti¤s.2
Burden of proof guidelines apply to large classes of cases, irrespective of
the detailed information only available at the court level. Hence, guidelines
will not always ensure coordination on the e¢ cient equilibrium. This leads
us to inquire whether a modied court procedure can eliminate the need
for guidelines. Up to now, our stylized court involved a purely passive
adjudicator whose only role is to decide at the close of the proceedings. The
modied procedure, as in the more inquisitorialtrials of civil law countries,
allows the adjudicator to intervene during the proceedings by interrogating
the parties directly and purposely shifting the burden of proof. Specically,
the adjudicator announces how he will rule should no additional evidence be
forthcoming (both binding and non binding announcements are considered).
We show that the optimal liability assignment then obtains as the unique
equilibrium if the active adjudicator abides by the preponderance standard
and common law exclusionary rules. The interpretation is that, with a more
2In our analysis as in actual practice, the plainti¤ always bears the so-called primary
burden. Since he initiates the suit, he must provide some appropriate, albeit limited
evidence if he is to stand a chance of winning.
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active court, these rules of proof then su¢ ce for an e¢ cient decentralization
of decisions regarding liability.
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 describes the basic tort situation
that we have in mind. The next two sections assume that society can commit
to a liability assignment as a function of the disclosed evidence, without yet
introducing courts as ex post decision-makers. Section 3 analyzes the opti-
mal scheme for the purpose of inducing care, i.e., we determine how liability
should be assigned on the basis of the evidence made available by the par-
ties. The liability assignment takes into account the potential tort-feasorsex
ante incentives to exert care and the partiesex post incentives to submit and
manipulate evidence. We show that the optimal scheme satises a more-
likely-than-notproperty. Section 4 discusses how the mechanism can also be
interpreted in terms of the allocation of the burden of proof. Section 5, which
contains the main results, examines whether the optimal liability assignment
can be obtained as an equilibrium when decisions regarding liability are del-
egated to a court, now an additional player in the game. This requires that
we analyze what general legal rules should constrain court decision-making.
We show that the appropriate rules include the preponderance of evidence
standard of proof and exclusionary rules as in common law. We discuss the
need for burden of proof assignments as coordination device and the role of
more inquisitorial courts. Section 6 reviews the related literature, discusses
extensions, and concludes. Proofs are in the appendix unless statements are
obvious from the text.
2 The Model
A party, denoted D, undertakes a socially valuable activity which may im-
pose harm on a third party, denoted P , depending on how the activity is
undertaken. If D exerts high care h, no harm is imposed. If low care l is
taken, P su¤ers a loss of amount L. With low care D obtains a private
benet c, for instance the cost savings from not exerting high care. When
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c < L, low care is socially undesirable. The cost c is distributed according
to the cumulative distribution function G(c), but it is privately known to
D at each instance where a choice of care level must be made. Thus, if D
were fully liable whenever he causes harm, he would exert high care in all
instances where c < L, hence with probability G(L), which would be socially
optimal.
The occurrence of harm, equivalently whether D undertook action l, is
not directly veriable. Only some body of evidence, denoted by x, is avail-
able. This may include witness testimony aboutDs behavior, expert opinion
about whether P su¤ered harm, documents, etc. Ex ante, the content of the
evidence x is uncertain with potential realizations in a countable set X and
a probability distribution that depends on Ds care level. We denote this
probability by pj(x), where j is either h or l, so that
P
x2X pj(x) = 1. In this
formulation, it is possible that some realizations of the evidence reveal Ds
behavior or the occurrence of harm perfectly. This occurs when ph(x) = 0
and pl(x) = 1 or conversely when ph(x) = 1 and pl(x) = 0. If this were true
for all x 2 X, the evidence would be fully informative. We assume this is
not the case.3
To illustrate, suppose P has utility function u = ln q+w where w is wealth
and q is an index of physical well-being, say the individuals health status.
If the physician or hospital takes high care, the potential health status is the
random variable eqh while with low care it is eql = eqh, where  < 1. In money
equivalents, the loss due to low care is L =   ln . If the only evidence were
the individuals health status, i.e., x = q, this would generally constitute
relatively poor evidence about the physicians care, depending on the extent
to which the supports of eqh and eql overlap. However, x could also include
additional direct evidence about the physicians actions.
Party P (now the plainti¤) can sue party D (now the defendant) but
can hope to prevail only by submitting evidence. We rst consider the case
3We assume ph(x) + pl(x) > 0 for all x 2 X (i.e., X is the union of the supports of the
two distributions).
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where the parties have perfect access to the evidence x, assuming that the
cost of submitting evidence is negligible. The issue is how liability should be
assigned, on the basis of the evidence, in order to induce D to exert opti-
mal care as often as possible. We impose the constraint that the defendant
cannot be held liable for more than the possible loss (we discuss below the
e¤ect of allowing punitive damages). Let  (x) 2 [0; 1] denote the liability
assignment.  (x) = 1 means that the defendant is held liable for the full
amount L when the evidence is x,  (x) = 0 that he is not liable, while a
value between zero and unity amounts to randomization or to damages for
only a fraction of the potential harm.
For a given liability assignment function, Ds expected liability costs are
L
X
x2X
pj(x) (x); j = h; l:
Taking the cost c into account, D therefore chooses not to impose harm if
 
X
x2X
[pl(x)  ph(x)] (x)  c
L
: (1)
The expression on the left-hand side, which we refer to as deterrence, is the
increase in the probability of being held liable when action l is chosen rather
than h.
It is easily seen that   1 under any  , a value of unity being feasible
only if the evidence perfectly reveals Ds behavior. With imperfectly infor-
mative evidence, high care is exerted only when c  L < L, which means
that there is insu¢ cient deterrence. The best liability assignment function
is therefore the one which maximizes deterrence equivalently, which maxi-
mizes the probability G(L) that no harm is caused.
Proposition 1 The deterrence maximizing liability assignment, as a func-
tion of the evidence x 2 X, is  (x) = 1 when pl(x) > ph(x),  (x) = 0
otherwise.
To maximize deterrence,  (x) should be set at its maximum value of
unity when the expression in brackets in (1) is positive, and at its minimum
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value of zero when the expression is negative. When the expression is nil,
the value of  (x) is indi¤erent. We set it equal to zero in this case, which
may be interpreted as putting the burden of persuasion on the plainti¤.4
The proposition has a straightforward interpretation. pj(x) is the prob-
ability of the data represented by x conditionally on the hypothesis j 2
fh; lg being true. In statistical terminology, it would be referred to as the
likelihoodof hypothesis j on the basis of the observable data. Thus, the
proposition states that the defendant should be liable when l is more likely
than h, given the evidence. Under such a scheme and given a small cost of
submitting evidence, when pl(x) > ph(x) the plainti¤ les suit and submits
x, otherwise he does not le suit.
Consider now the possibility of punitive damages B > L. A su¢ ciently
large B can obviously implement the rst best provided we do not run into
bankruptcy problems. The potential defendant now exerts high care if
c  B
X
x2X
[pl(x)  ph(x)] (x):
Optimal care requires that B be set so that
L = B
X
x2X
[pl(x)  ph(x)] (x):
This can be satised in an innite number of ways, but clearly   leads to
the smallest level of punitive damages, say B, consistent with the rst best.
Thus, another justication for the liability assignment function of proposition
1 is that it minimizes the punitive damages consistent with inducing optimal
care.5 Alternatively, it may be that the defendants wealth is smaller than
B, so that the rst-best is unattainable. Holding the defendant liable up to
4The result is borrowed from Demougin and Fluet (2006) see also Lando (2002) for a
similar nding. Note that society is asumed to be indi¤erent to error per se. If error were
socially costly,  should take into account the trade-o¤ between deterrence and avoiding
error (see Demougin and Fluet, 2005).
5Large punitive damages generate other distorsions since they inate the cost of en-
gaging in the risky activity, e.g., becoming a physician.
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his entire wealth and using   is then the best one can do. In what follows,
we stick to our earlier interpretation and assume compensatory damages, i.e.,
a liable defendant pays the plainti¤ the amount L.
We henceforth relax the assumption that the parties have perfect access
to all the potential evidence. To discard straightforward unraveling results,
we also assume that society, as Principal, does not know the extent of the
veriable evidence available to the parties. To make things as simple as
possible, suppose the complete body of evidence can be partitioned as x =
(y; z) with y 2 Y and z 2 Z(y) dened as the set of potential additional
evidence consistent with the partial evidence y. Both parties always have
access to y, but may not be able to also submit z. For example, the potential
evidence could consist of the content of two separate les. The parties
always have access to the rst le y but may not be able to access the second
le z. Moreover, the parties may di¤er in their capacity to present veriable
evidence. Party P has access to z only with probability v, party D only with
probability u, where u; v 2 (0; 1).
Any reasonable liability assignment scheme requires that P submit at
least y in order to prevail. Indeed, P is the only party with an interest in
initiating proceedings and it is known that part y of the evidence is accessible
to him. However, as parties may be only partly informed, when only y is
disclosed society does not know whether this is because the parties did not
observe all the potential evidence or whether an informed party chose not
to disclose z. We denote by  the case where society does not receive the
additional evidence. Note that we make the usual assumption that false
evidence cannot be fabricated.
The issue is now to choose a liability assignment scheme of the form
 (y; z) 2 [0; 1] where y 2 Y , z 2 Z(y)[fg. Although the objective remains
that of providing the best ex ante incentives to exert care i.e., maximize
deterrence account must now be taken of the fact that  will also a¤ect
the partiesex post incentives to disclose evidence. In turn, this will have
repercussions on Ds ex ante incentives to exert care.
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3 Optimal Liability Assignment
The set-up is described by the following time line. First, society chooses at
the outset a function  for assigning liability, should P le suit (no dam-
ages are paid if no suit is led). Second, Nature chooses c according to the
distribution G(c), D observes c and decides between action h or l. Third,
Nature chooses the evidence x = (y; z) according to the joint probability
distribution pj(y; z) depending on whether j is h or l, where y 2 Y and
z 2 Z(y). Fourth, P (respectively D) observes z with probability v (re-
spectively u); neither party knows whether the other has seen the complete
potential evidence.
At this point, party P decides whether to le suit, where ling suit entails
the submission of y. We call this the ling stage. Next, if a suit has been led,
both parties decide simultaneously whether to submit additional evidence (if
they can). We call this the disclosure stage. Finally, society assigns liability
according to  on the basis of the overall evidence submitted, (y; z) or (y; )
as the case may be. Notice that we do not yet discuss courts, but merely
seek to characterize the deterrence maximizing liability assignment.6 Figure
1 summarizes the time line.
c
Nature
h or l
D Nature
(y, z)
Nature
P, D observe
z (or not)
files y
(or not)
P D, P
submit
z or ø
Society
y liability
assigned
y
Figure 1: Liability assignment function  
Solving the game backwards, we rst analyze the stages consisting of the
decision to le suit and the ensuing disclosure game. As before, submitting
evidence is assumed to involve an arbitrarily small cost (we further discuss
the role of submission costs at the end of the section). Such a cost is incurred
by P if he les suit and submits y. A similar cost is also incurred by any party
submitting the additional evidence z. It is easily seen that the parties then
6 has the same interpretation as the sanctioning functionin Shavell (1989), except
that our sanction is a transfer from the defendant to the plainti¤.
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have dominant strategies. For instance, suppose the victim led suit and
the injurer observed z. If  (y; z) <  (y; ) the injurer discloses z since by
doing so he reduces the probability of paying damages. If  (y; z)   (y; )
he does not reveal z. Note that a partys belief as to whether the other party
has observed z is irrelevant; the same is true of the victims belief about the
defendants care level.7
Lemma 1 The following strategy pair is the unique equilibrium of the le and
disclosure game. (i) If P observes z and  (y; ) <  (y; z), P les suit and
discloses z at the next stage; if z is not observed or if  (y; z)   (y; ), P les
suit provided  (y; ) > 0 but submits nothing at the next stage; in all other
cases P does not le suit. (ii) If a suit has been led and  (y; z) <  (y; ),
D discloses z if he can; otherwise he discloses nothing.
We denote by pj(y) the marginal probability of partial evidence y, given
that D has chosen action j. We write pj(z jy) for the conditional probability
of the additional evidence z 2 Z(y), given that the partial evidence is y and
that care was j.
Conditional on y, the probability of D being held liable, when care level
j was exerted, is equal to
ej(y) :=  (y; ) + v
X
z2Z(y)
pj(z jy)max[0;  (y; z)   (y; )]
 u
X
z2Z(y)
pj(z jy)max[0;  (y; )   (y; z)]: (2)
The expression follows directly from the outcome of the disclosure game, tak-
ing into account each partiesprobability of accessing the complete evidence
7Bull and Watson (2004) develop a model where veriability is associated with the
enforcers actual observation of hard evidence. Taking y as given, think of each realization
z 2 Z(y) as a particular document. The random draws with probability u or v determine
whether D or P possesses the document. The document z is veriable by the enforcer
(i.e., will actually be observed by him) if D has the document and  (y; z) >  (y; ) or if
P has it and  (y; z) <  (y; ).
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and the incentives to disclose (the derivation is in the proof of proposition
2). Ex ante, as a function of the level of care, the probability of being held
liable is therefore
P
y2Y pj(y)ej(y).
As in section 2, the best scheme is the one which maximizes the di¤erence
in the probability of being held liable when low rather than high care is
exerted. This means that  must be chosen so as to maximize deterrence,
now written as
 =
X
y2Y
[pl(y)el(y)  ph(y)eh(y)]: (3)
Proposition 2 When the parties may be only partly informed, deterrence is
maximized by  (y; z) as dened in proposition 1 when z 2 Z(y),  (y; ) =
1 if pl(y)Ql(y) > ph(y)Qh(y) and  
(y; ) = 0 otherwise, where
Qj(y)  (1  v)(1  u) + (1  u)v
X
z2Z(y)
[1   (y; z)] pj(z j y)
+ (1  v)u
X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z) pj(z j y); j = h; l: (4)
The expression in (4) is the conditional probability of z not being revealed
given Ds care level and the realization y. The rationale is that z remains
undisclosed either because both parties are uninformed or only one is in-
formed but would not disclose evidence unfavorable to his case. pj(y)Qj(y)
is therefore the probability of the event partial evidence is y and z not
revealed given Ds ex ante action. Recalling statistical terminology once
more, the expression is the likelihood of action j on the basis of the available
data. Thus, the proposition shows that the more-likely-than-not property
still holds even when disclosure is an issue. However, the probability as-
sessments now take into consideration the partiescapability of submitting
evidence and their motive for not disclosing.8 Notice that   2 f0; 1g as in
the previous section, i.e., the liability assignment is all-or-nothing.
8The result is derived for a binary partition of the body of evidence, but the argument
obviously extends to ner partitions.
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Small submission costs ensured a unique equilibrium in the le and dis-
closure game. However, the non uniqueness that would arise with zero costs
is inconsequential, i.e.,   is also deterrence maximizing if submission costs
are nil. For instance, when  (y; z) =  (y; ), an informed defendant would
be indi¤erent between disclosing and not disclosing. Whether he does or not,
the liability assignment and therefore deterrence remain the same.
A more interesting extension is when the cost of submitting z is non neg-
ligible. Recalling that   is all-or-nothing, the disclosure strategies described
in lemma 1 remain dominant strategies as long as the cost of submitting z
is smaller than the stakes represented by L. It follows that   is still deter-
rence maximizing. We henceforth continue to assume that the cost of ling
suit and submitting y is small, but allow that of submitting z to be non
negligible.9 The interpretation is that y concerns the basic facts of the case
and is straightforward to submit, while z involves more complex evidence.
Although submission costs play no role at this stage, they will be relevant
when we discuss court decision-making.
4 Burden of Proof
In legal terminology, the plainti¤ is said to bear the burden of proof if he
loses unless he produces enough evidence supporting his claim. Conversely,
the burden rests on the defendant if he is held liable unless he produces
evidence in his favor. The procedure is nevertheless always initiated by the
plainti¤ who bears the primary burden of establishing that the case is
worth hearing. In the model, this is captured by the fact that the plainti¤
must le suit in order to obtain damages and cannot but submit y when a
suit is led. In what follows, the burden of proof (or so-called burden of
production) refers to how the task of producing the additional evidence is
9However, we assume it is not too large, otherwise it could be relevant for society to
consider the trade-o¤ between deterrence and litigation costs, an issue we wish to avoid
at this point. We discuss it in the conclusion.
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apportioned between the parties.
Given the partial evidence y, the scheme assigns the burden to the plainti¤
if  (y; ) = 0 and to the defendant if  (y; ) = 1. There is a qualication.
It may be that none of the parties has an incentive to submit additional
evidence because  (y; z) =  (y; ) for all z 2 Z(y). This occurs when
z is insu¢ ciently informative compared to y. We say that y constitutes
mixed evidence if there exists z, z0 2 Z(y) such that pl(y; z) > ph(y; z) and
pl(y; z
0)  ph(y; z0), implying that the liability assignment can go either way
depending on what additional evidence is submitted. Otherwise, y represents
conclusive evidence.10
When y is conclusive, either pl(y; z) > ph(y; z) for all z 2 Z(y), yielding
pl(y) > ph(y), or pl(y; z)  ph(y; z) for all z 2 Z(y), yielding pl(y)  ph(y).
Moreover, Qh(y) = Ql(y) as is easily seen from (4). Disclosing additional
evidence then cannot change the liability assignment. By contrast, when y is
mixed, one of the parties benets from disclosing additional evidence in his
favor. Thus,  (y; ) captures the concept of burden of proof only when the
partial evidence is mixed. The next results characterize the optimal liability
assignment.
Corollary 1 If y is conclusive or if u = v,  (y; ) = 1 if pl(y) > ph(y),
otherwise  (y; ) = 0.
When the partial evidence is conclusive, disclosing additional evidence is
irrelevant. Liability is then assigned according to the likelihood of l versus
h computed on the basis of the rawmarginal probabilities. When u = v,
disclosing evidence may benet a party, but strategic incentives to conceal
evidence cancel out. The burden of proof is then assigned on the basis of the
rawmarginal probabilities.11
10Note that evidence is labelled conclusive in terms of the more-likely-than-not criterion.
It need not be perfectly informative.
11From (4), when u = v < 1, Qj(y) = 1  u for all y 2 Y , j = h; l:
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Corollary 2 If y is mixed,  (y; ) = 1 if u is su¢ ciently larger than v,
 (y; ) = 0 if v is su¢ ciently larger than u and pl(y; z) < ph(y; z) for some
z 2 Z(y).
When y is mixed, the burden of proof depends on the partieslikely access
to the additional evidence. The burden tends to be on the better informed
party, but taking into account the raw information content of y.12 We
illustrate the results through an example.
An example
Let the evidence set be X = fa; b; c; d; e; fg with probabilities given as in the
rst two lines of table 1. The third line gives the likelihood ratio of l versus
h on the basis of the complete evidence. Under the optimal scheme, the
defendant is liable if x = e or f . The partial evidence y, in the middle part
of the table, corresponds to a coarser partition of the complete evidence. The
realization cd is conclusive evidence in favor of D (i.e., it does not matter
whether the complete evidence is c or d), so that P would not sue when
observing y = cd. By contrast, af and be represent mixed evidence.
The bottom part of the table gives the likelihood ratio of l versus h under
partial evidence and taking into account the partiesstrategic incentives to
disclose under the optimal scheme, i.e., the ratio is
pl(y)Ql(y)
ph(y)Qh(y)
where Qh and Ql are as dened in proposition 2.
12The asymmetry in corollary 2 is due to the fact that mixed evidence is consitent with
pl(y; z)  ph(y; z) for all z 2 Z(y). The burden of proof should then be on the defendant
irrespective of u or v. Indeed, no deterrence is lost due to the possibility that the defendant
may not be able to submit evidence showing that h is as likely as l (recall the discussion of
proposition 1). By contrast, putting the burden on the plainti¤ (i.e., setting  (y; ) = 0)
would entail less deterrence, given the risk that the plainti¤ could not produce additional
evidence showing that l is more likely than h.
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When u = v, this likelihood ratio is the naiveratio pl(y)=ph(y) already
shown in the middle part of the table. Submissions are taken at their face
value. In this case, an uninformed plainti¤would sue only when y = af . The
burden of proof is then on the defendant to disclose a if he can. If informed,
the plainti¤ would also sue when y = be and x = e; that is, he would le suit
by submitting be and then submit e in a second step. The burden of proof
is then on the plainti¤.
Table 1: Burden of Proof
Evidence x = (y; z)
a b c d e f
ph(x) 0.068 0.222 0.340 0.170 0.190 0.010
pl(x) 0.004 0.042 0.328 0.166 0.330 0.130
pl(x)=ph(x) 0.059 0.189 0.965 0.976 1.737 13.00
Partial evidence y
af be cd
ph(y) 0.078 0.412 0.510
pl(y) 0.134 0.372 0.494
pl(y)=ph(y) 1.718 0.903 0.969
pl(y)Ql(y)=ph(y)Qh(y)
af be cd
u = v 1.718 0.903 0.969
u = :6, v = :8 0.953 0.650 0.969
u = :8, v = :6 3.104 1.153 0.969
When u 6= v, partial evidence acquires a di¤erent meaning. When u = 0:6
and v = 0:8, the burden is again on the plainti¤. An uninformed plainti¤then
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never sues since he would loose with only partial evidence, but an informed
one sues if x = e or f . Finally, when u = 0:8 and v = 0:6, the burden of
proof is on the defendant. When the evidence is mixed, the plainti¤ then
always sues. If he can, the defendant will then submit counter-evidence if it
is in his favor, i.e., when x = a or b.
5 Court Decision-Making
In the above analysis, society specied at the outset (and committed to) a
liability assignment for all possible evidentiary outcomes. How the evidence
is interpreted ex post  whether it suggests that the defendant actually
caused harm was not directly relevant. In practice, liability is a matter for
courts to decide. Moreover, courts are not provided with a detailed plan
of action such as   but must adjudicate, using discretion, on the basis of
general legal principles. Since the court decides ex post, what inferences it
draws from the evidence then plays a fundamental role.
In this section we discuss how the determination of liability can be del-
egated to a court, i.e., an adjudicator or judge, now an additional player in
the game. Our focus is the design of legal principles or rules for court
decision-making so as to implement the optimal liability assignment as an
equilibrium, using a version of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We show that,
if courts adjudicate on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard
of proof together with common law exclusionary rules, there exists an equi-
librium yielding the optimal liability assignment. Multiple equilibria may
nevertheless arise under the same set of rules. Directing courts as to the
allocation of the burden of proof is then useful in allowing coordination on
the superior equilibrium. An alternative is to let the court itself allocate
the burden of proof. We show that this is feasible if the court is given a
more managerialor inquisitorialrole, by contrast with that of a passive
adjudicator.
We rst examine the case of the passive court. The game tree is henceforth
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modied as follows. The initial stage, at which   was announced, disap-
pears. Instead, courts are provided with a set of guiding principles. Moreover,
an additional terminal stage is appended at which, if a suit has been led,
the court receives evidence of the form (y; z), y 2 Y , z 2 Z(y) [ fg. Upon
receiving that evidence, the court rules whetherD caused harm, which by law
implies that he is held liable. The courts decision is denoted by d 2 f0; 1g,
where d = 1 means that the defendant pays damages and d = 0 that he does
not. If no suit is led, there is no court action and D does not pay damages.
c
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Figure 2: Rules of proof
Thus, the game now includes the players D, P and the court as depicted
in gure 2. Everything is assumed to be common knowledge, except Ds cost
of care c and his action j 2 fh; lg which are known only to D (the action may
also possibly be known to P ), the partial evidence y which is initially known
only to D and P , and the additional evidence z 2 Z(y) which is initially
known only to D and/or P if they are informed. A party does not know
whether the other party observed the additional evidence, neither does the
court know whether parties are informed. As before, it is common knowledge
that P su¤ers a loss of amount L when D takes action l. Hence, the courts
role is only to assess whether Ds action was h or l.
The complete description of the game requires a specication of the
courts utility function. The latter will follow from the rules of proof,
as discussed below. The issue is whether, by maximizing its utility, the court
is led to assign liability optimally.
Standard of proof and exclusionary rules
The court is taken to be a perfect agent abiding by the rules that the law
imposes upon it. Our rst requirement is for the court to decide the contested
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issue on the basis of a preponderance of evidence, as this standard of proof
is usually understood. The defendant should be found to have caused harm
if and only if, upon the evidence, the care level l is more probable than h.
As is well known, this is equivalent to requiring that the court minimizes
the probability of error. The requirement therefore endows the court with a
utility function dened by the payo¤s
(d; j) =
(
1 if d = 0 and j = h or d = 1 and j = l,
0 otherwise.
(5)
As tie-breaking rule, when h and l are both equally probable, we take it that
the court decides against the plainti¤.
We next consider the equilibrium implications of this utility function.
Suppose that the parties anticipate d(y; z) =  (y; z) for all y 2 Y and
z 2 Z(y)[ fg. Party Ds choice of care level, party Ps decision to le suit
and the outcome of the disclosure game are then the same as before. Denote
by Sj(y; z) the equilibrium probability of the outcome suit is led and court
receives evidence (y; z), conditional on care level j having been exerted.
For the case where z 2 Z(y), we have
Sj(y; z) =
8><>:
upj(y; z) if  
(y; z) = 0,  (y; ) = 1;
vpj(y; z) if  
(y; z) = 1,  (y; ) = 0;
0 otherwise, where y 2 Y , z 2 Z(y); j = h; l:
(6)
If  (y; ) = 1, the plainti¤ sues on the basis of y and has no incentive to
submit further evidence; the defendant submits z if he is informed and the
additional evidence satises  (y; z) = 0. The probability for the court to
observe (y; z) satisfying the conditions of the top entry is therefore upj(y; z).
When the evidence satises the conditions of the middle entry, the plain-
ti¤ cannot prevail under y alone. He then sues only if informed and if
 (y; z) = 1, hence the probability vpj(y; z) that such evidence is submit-
ted. In all other cases, the event suit is led and court receives evidence
(y; z)is out-of-equilibrium and its probability is therefore nil. The event is
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out-of-equilibrium either because the plainti¤ does not sue or because such a
combination of the complete evidence is never submitted when a suit is led.
Bayesian up-dating along the equilibrium path (that is, when Sj(y; z) > 0
for j = h or j = l or both13) implies that, given the complete evidence, the
courts posterior probability about the defendants action is
 (j j y; z) = 
0
jSj(y; z)
0hSh(y; z) + 
0
l Sl(y; z)
=
0jpj(y; z)
0hph(y; z) + 
0
l pl(y; z)
; j = h; l; z 2 Z(y); (7)
where the second equality follows from (6) and where 0h, 
0
l = 1 0h denote
the courts priors at the start of the proceedings. Under the preponderance
standard (equivalently, when the court maximizes its expected utility), the
defendant is held liable if  (l j y; z) >  (h j y; z), that is if
0l pl(y; z) > 
0
hph(y; z): (8)
Recall that the optimal mechanism generates the deterrence level .
Given the distribution function G over the cost of care, this translates into a
probability G(L) that the defendant exerted care. Thus, in equation (7), a
Bayesian court would use 0h = G(L
). Obviously, except nongenerically, a
court adjudicating according to (8) will then not implement the optimal lia-
bility assignment, which requires the decision d(y; z) = 1 if pl(y; z) > ph(y; z).
Thus, the preponderance standard does not yield the appropriate out-
come. We therefore consider imposing an additional requirement upon court
decision-making. This takes the form of evidentiary rules. We ask the
court to abstract from its knowledge of the cost distribution G and to ap-
proach the case with normativepriors 0h = 
0
l =
1
2
. The interpretation,
quoting Posner (1999), is that we want the trier of fact to work with prior
odds of 1 to 1 ... that the plainti¤ has a meritorious case. To illustrate, the
13By assumption, ph(y; z) + pl(y; z) > 0 for all y 2 Y , z 2 Z(y). Hence, when the
conditions in the top or middle entry of (6) hold, Sj > 0 for j = h or j = l (or both).
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court should put on an equalfooting defendants drawn from two popula-
tions di¤ering by the cost distribution G, hence di¤ering in the actual prior
probability of having caused harm. In other words, courts should disregard
as inadmissible information pertaining to the defendantsreputation for be-
having a certain way or to their propensity to act negligently. We refer to
the standard of proof and evidentiary rules as the rules of proof.
Clearly, a court abiding by the rules of proof does not minimize the actual
probability of error.14 Rather, it is as if it sought to minimize error from the
perspective of an agent holding neutral priors about the individual case upon
which it has to decide. Observe that this provides a way out of such classic
conundrums as the bus case and the gate crashers paradox. In the
latter, 600 of the 1000 people in the audience of a rock concert crashed the
gate and did not pay the ticket. Assuming all legitimate ticket stubs have
been lost, should someone picked at random in the audience be held liable,
given that there is a 60% chance that he was a gate crasher? According to
the rules of proof described above, nakedstatistical evidence pertaining to
G() should simply not be considered.
Proposition 3 The optimal liability assignment d(y; z) =  (y; z), y 2 Y ,
z 2 Z(y) [ fg, is part of an equilibrium with court decision-making con-
strained by the rules of proof.
Up to this point we have shown that, under the rules of proof, the courts
decision is consistent with the optimal mechanism when the whole potential
evidence is received. To complete the proof of proposition 3, it remains to
show that this is also true when the evidence is (y; ) at the close of the
proceedings.
In equilibrium, such an outcome occurs only if  (y; ) = 1 and the
defendant is either uninformed of the true z or gains nothing by submitting
14This contrasts with the justication of the preponderance standard that prevails in
the legal literature (e.g., Sherwin and Clermont, 2002). In a related model, Fluet (2003)
compares the ex ante incentives to exert care under truth-seeking courts versus courts
abiding by the rules of proof.
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the additional evidence because  (y; z) = 1 as well. When  (y; ) = 0, the
outcome (y; ) is not part of the equilibrium because an uninformed plainti¤
does not sue. Taking the above into consideration, the probability of suit is
led and evidence is (y; ), conditional on the level of care, is therefore
Sj(y; ) =
(
pj(y)
h
1  u+ uPz2Z(y)  (y; z)pj(z j y)i if  (y; ) = 1;
0 otherwise, where y 2 Y , j = h; l:
(9)
Along the equilibrium path, using the courts normative priors, the
posterior probabilities about the defendants action are then
 (j j y; ) = (
1
2
)Sj(y; )
(1
2
)Sh(y; ) + (
1
2
)Sl(y; )
; j = h; l:
Hence,  (l j y; ) >  (h j y; ) and therefore d(y; ) = 1 if Sl(y; ) >
Sh(y; ). We now show that the latter holds along the equilibrium path.
For this purpose, observe that Qj(y) in proposition 2 can be rewritten as
Qj(y) = 1  u+ (u  v)
X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)pj(z jy): (10)
Substituting in (9), we get
Sj(y; ) = pj(y)
24Qj(y) + v X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)pj(z j y)
35 ; j = h; l:
Therefore,
Sl(y; )  Sh(y; ) = [pl(y)Ql(y)  ph(y)Qh(y)]
+ v
X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z) [pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)] > 0:
The sign follows whenever  (y; ) = 1, i.e. along the equilibrium path. To
see this, observe that by proposition 2, the rst bracket on the right-hand-side
is then positive. Moreover, by proposition 1, the second expression is always
nonnegative. Altogether, along the equilibrium path, the courts decisions
under the rules of proof implement the optimal liability assignment. In the
appendix we discuss out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain the equilibrium.
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Multiple equilibria
The foregoing analysis showed that the optimal liability assignment is con-
sistent with courts operating on the basis of the preponderance standard and
exclusionary rules. Note that the discussion did not refer to the allocation
of the burden of proof, although section 4 showed that the optimal mech-
anism entails a burden of proof assignment. Under the rules of proof, the
appropriate allocation of the burden arose spontaneously in the form of
presumptions in favor of or against the defendant. Indeed, the argument
was that, if the partiesle and disclosure strategies were the same as under
the mechanism  , then the courts best reply would be d =  , thereby
sustaining the optimal liability assignment as an equilibrium. However, this
leaves open the possibility that there are other equilibria, possibly ine¢ cient
ones, that are also consistent with the same rules of proof. Specically, if
the parties choose their actions under the belief that the courts strategy is
d(y; ) 6=  (y; ), can d(y; ) be a best reply for the court?
We illustrate this possibility with the example in Table 1. Recall from
section 4 that a party was said to bear the burden of proof if he is the only
party with a possible incentive to submit z. In the optimal mechanism for the
example of table 1, the defendant bears the burden when u = :8 and v = :6;
he is then always held liable when the partial evidence is mixed, which is
when y is either af or be. By contrast, the plainti¤ bears the burden when
u = :6 and v = :8, since mixed evidence is then not su¢ cient for the plainti¤
to win.
Table 2 reproduces the optimal  (y; ) for these two cases. The strat-
egy d(y; ), which allocates the burden of proof di¤erently, is also part of
a sequential equilibrium consistent with the rules of proof. The table gives
d(y; ) only for mixed evidence; in all other cases the courts decision is the
same as  .
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Table 2: Ine¢ cient Equilibria
u = :6, v = :8 u = :8, v = :6
Partial evidence y Partial evidence y
af be af be
 (y; ) 0 0 1 1
d(y; ) 1 1 1 0
Sl(y; )=Sh(y; ) 3.51 1.24 5.61 0.90a
aOut of equilibrium, as described in the text.
To see that d(y; ) as shown is part of an equilibrium, consider rst the
case u = :6, v = :8. In contrast to the optimal liability assignment, it is
now as if the court had a presumption against the defendant. The plainti¤
therefore always sues when the evidence is mixed and he never submits z.
Since the plainti¤ wins under (y; ), the probability Sj(y; ) is as dened
in equation (9) but with d(y; ) substituted for  (y; ). Using the gures
in table 1, this yields Sl(y; ) > Sh(y; ). Holding the defendant liable is
therefore warranted under the rules of proof.
When u = :8 and v = :6, the liability assignment under the optimal
mechanism is for the defendant to bear the burden of proof. However, in the
equilibrium represented in table 2, the defendant prevails when the partial
evidence is be. His best response is therefore to remain passive should a suit
be led. Accordingly, an uninformed plainti¤ does not sue when the partial
evidence is be since he has nothing to gain (an informed plainti¤ would sue
only if the complete evidence is e). Given the courts strategy, the event
suit is led and evidentiary outcome is beis clearly out of equilibrium. In
the table, Sl(be; )=Sh(be; ) is derived under the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
that an uninformed plainti¤ sues by mistake with probability ". Hence,
conditional on the level of care, the evidence be is presented to the court
with probability (1   v)pj(be)". This leads to the posterior odds in table
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2.15 Thus, under the rules of proof, the defendant is not held liable, which
sustains the equilibrium.
In both cases, the intuition is the same. An equilibrium is based on self-
sustaining presumptions. These a¤ect equilibrium strategies, which in turn
a¤ect the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Hence, multiple
equilibria are possible under the same rules of proof. In the example, all
the equilibria are equally reasonable. In fact, the multiplicity of equilibria
illustrated in the example is generic, as shown by the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Under the rules of proof, there are multiple equilibria if u
and v are su¢ ciently large. For any y 2 Y constituting mixed evidence,
d(y; ) = 1 is part of one equilibrium and d(y; ) = 0 of another.
When u and v are small, the courts assessment is essentially determined
by whether pl(y) is greater or less than ph(y). The naive information
content of y dominates since the parties are relatively unlikely to possess
additional information. Hence, the equilibrium is unique. By contrast, when
u and v are large, the interpretation of (y; ) is equilibrium determined, hence
the existence of multiple equilibria.
Burden of proof and active judges
This suggests a role for additional judicial tools in order to help select the
right equilibrium. One possibility is to provide courts with guidelines re-
garding the allocation of the burden of proof. For instance, suppose there is
a category of cases corresponding to u = :6 and v = :8. For this category,
courts could be instructed to let the plainti¤s bear the burden.
15These are the same as the uncorrected odds in table 1. There are other possibil-
ities. The court could rationalize the out-of-equilibrium outcome as a suit by either an
uninformed plainti¤ or an informed one with unfavorable evidence. This would lead to
even smaller posterior odds Sl=Sh. The equilibrium is sustained as long as the court does
not put too much weight on the possibility that an informed plainti¤ sued on the basis of
favorable complete evidence, but then forgotto submit z.
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An interpretation is that courts are then required to use a specic pre-
sumption. In terms of the model, the guideline could also be interpreted as
a statement to the e¤ect that a plainti¤ can prevail only if he also submits
the second le(which contains z). This amounts to specifying the type of
evidence required to win a suit, i.e., it characterizes the necessary conditions
for a proof. Such guidelines could be imposed through statute law or follow
from rulings by higher jurisdictions. They could also derive from custom or
general jurisprudence. Whatever the means, the important point is that the
burden assignment does not follow from the rules of proof alone at the trial
court level. Obviously, burden of proof guidelines must apply to large classes
of cases, irrespective of the detailed information only available at the court
level. In general, they will therefore not be su¢ cient to ensure coordination
on the e¢ cient equilibrium.
In the remainder we consider another possibility. So far, our stylized court
procedure involved a purely passiveadjudicator whose only role is to decide
at the close of the proceedings, once the parties have presented evidence
favouring their case. We now allow the adjudicator to intervene during the
proceedings, as in the more inquisitorial procedure of civil law countries. By
contrast with a purely adversarial (i.e., party controlled) procedure, where
the judge sits as a silent referee, the inquisitorial judge interrogates the
parties or witnesses directly and may purposely shift the burden of proof. In
civil litigation, the more or less active role of the judge is one of the main
di¤erences between the common law and civil law procedures, since most if
not all of the evidence is supplied by the parties in both systems.
We model the active court as follows. As before, the courts decision
is d(y; z), for y 2 Y and z 2 Z(y) [ fg, at the close of the proceedings.
However, the game is augmented to include an intermediate stage, after the
plainti¤s decision to le suit and the presentation of y and before the poten-
tial disclosure of additional evidence. At this intermediate stage, the judge
interrogates the parties for possible additional evidence and may suggest how
he would rule on the basis of the evidence presented so far. Formally, the
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judge makes an announcement b 2 f0; 1g, where b = 1 means su¢ cient,
i.e., it conveys that the plainti¤ will prevail on the basis of the evidence y
alone unless additional evidence is brought forward by the defendant. In
other words, b = 1 suggests that the burden of proof is on the defendant and
is equivalent to interrogating the defendant under the threat of adjudicat-
ing against him. Conversely, b = 0 means insu¢ cient and suggests that
the burden of proof is still on the plainti¤. The gures 3 and 4 emphasize
the di¤erence between burden of proof guidelines imposed from aboveand
burden of proof shifts through announcements at the trial court level.
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We rst consider the case where announcements are binding. To illus-
trate, in German civil procedure, the judge may inform a party that, unless
he presents some additional more convincing evidence, the court is likely to
rule a certain way. Such a judicial adviceis written to the protocol of the
proceeding, which in general would make it di¢ cult for a judge not to follow
through (otherwise a mislead party would have ground for appeal).16 We
show that, if judicial announcements are binding and the judge otherwise
abides by the rules of proof, there is a unique equilibrium characterized by
16The practice of richterliche Hinweisis described in Zivilprozessordnung, article 139.
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the optimal liability assignment. We next consider non binding announce-
ments. The communication stage is then purely rhetorical, involving cheap
talk. We show that the same results nevertheless follow if one assumes that
credibleannouncements are believed by the parties.
Denote by b(y) the judges announcement strategy, i.e., the announcement
at the information set where a suit has been led and he partial evidence
is y. When announcement are binding, decisions at the terminal adjudication
stage are constrained by d(y; ) = b(y). We have the following result.
Proposition 5 If the judges announcements are binding, the equilibrium
is unique and the judges strategy under the rules of proof satises b(y) =
 (y; ), d(y; ) = b(y), d(y; z) =  (y; z), y 2 Y , z 2 Z(y).
Given the rules of proof, the judge and the parties know that d(y; z) =
 (y; z) will be chosen if the complete evidence is disclosed. Faced with a
binding announcement, the parties have dominant strategies regarding dis-
closure. Anticipating the partiesresponse, the judge therefore chooses b to
maximize his expected payo¤ (the probability of not making mistakes), us-
ing the normativepriors about the defendants care level and conditionally
on his beliefs at the information set y. These beliefs do not depend on the
partiess strategies, hence the equilibrium is unique.
We now extend the analysis to non binding announcements. As is well
known from the cheap talk literature, there always exists an equilibrium
where costless statements are considered to be meaningless. In the present
context, this would mean that the outcome of the game with inquisitorial
judge is the same as with a passive adjudicator. In what follows, we select
equilibria satisfying the condition that credible statements about planned
behavior are believed. Standard requirements for credibility are that an-
nouncements be self-committing and self-signalling (see for instance Farrell
and Rabin, 1996).
Consider the rst requirement. At the information set y, the announce-
ment b is self-committing when d(y; ) = b is the judges best response at
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the adjudication stage, if he expects the announcement to be believed. This
requires that d(y; ) be part of an equilibrium. From proposition 3, it fol-
lows that the announcement b =  (y; ) is self-committing. In particular,
when the game with passive adjudicator has a unique equilibrium, then the
only credible announcements are those which yield the optimal liability as-
signment. However, from proposition 4, we know that there are cases where
d(y; ) 6=  (y; ) is also part of an equilibrium. Hence, an announcement
b0 6=  (y; ) would also be self-committing, although by proposition 5 the
judge would prefer to announce b and carry out his plan if he expected b to
be believed.
However, a judge announcing b may still be tempted to adjudicate ac-
cording to b0 if he thinks the announcement of b will not be believed. In
particular, a di¢ culty arises if the payo¤ from adjudicating according to b0 is
greater when the parties play under the belief that the judge will stick to b.
Knowing this, it could be rational for the parties not to believe b. The self-
signalling requirement is an additional condition ruling out this di¢ culty.17
Announcements are self-signalling if the judge would not want the parties to
believe he will play some b00 if he intends to play otherwise, i.e., if he has no
incentive to be misleading about his intentions, whatever these are. We show
that this requirement is satised.
Lemma 2 The judges announcements of d(y; ) are self-signalling.
Given the self-signalling property, self-committing announcements should
therefore be believed. The next result then follows directly from proposi-
tion 5.
Proposition 6 Under the rules of proof, d(y; z) =  (y; z), y 2 Y , z 2
Z(y) [ fg, is part of the unique equilibrium satisfying the condition that
credible announcements are believed.
17The condition is due to Aumann (1990). Baliga and Morris (2002) provide an illumi-
nating discussion of the two conditions.
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6 Related literature and conclusions
Posner (1999) remarked that the economic literature on the law of evidence
is scanty in relation to its scope and importance. While there is an already
vast literature on litigation, the legal principles constraining court decision-
making have been little discussed from the usual standpoint of law and eco-
nomics. Our contribution has been to provide a simple model to analyze
some of the basic issues concerning rules of proof and procedures. We sum-
marize our main results, relate them to the literature and suggest possible
extensions.
It has been emphasized elsewhere (in particular Daughety and Reinganum
2000a, 2000b) that the trial process cannot be purely Bayesian due to eviden-
tiary rules and other features of the procedure. It has also often been noted
that it may be useful to commit Bayesian decision-makers to rules that may
not be optimal ex post from an error-minimizing perspective (e.g., Schrag
and Scotchmer 1994, Daughety and Reinganum 1995, Lewis and Poitevin
1997, Sanchirico 2001b, Bernhardt and Nosal 2004). We showed that, if the
purpose of tort law is deterrence, the preponderance standard and the usual
exclusionary rules under common law are e¢ cient. An extension would be to
dwell deeper into the characterization of courts as constrained-Bayesians
and consider rules of proof in more complex litigation.
The trial was modelled as a persuasion game in the manner of Milgrom
and Roberts (1986), assuming that the extent of the interested partiesinfor-
mation is not veriable, as in Shin (1998). One di¤erence with the latter is
that there are typically multiple equilibria in our set-up, which explains the
need for burden of proof guidelines or for a more active judge. Multiple equi-
libria arise non trivially because of our assumption that presenting evidence
is costly, so that parties have no incentives to submit favorable evidence un-
less it strictly improves their prospects. Similar results were also obtained
by Sobel (1985) in a model where proofs are costly. We showed that an ac-
tive judge, operating under common law rules of proof, would allocate the
burden of proof e¢ ciently. Even if burden of proof announcements are not
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binding, the active judge can elicit e¢ cient disclosure by credibly threatening
the parties to adjudicate a certain way.
These results shed light on the adversarial versus inquisitorial controversy.
The distinction refers to the role of the judge versus the partiesin the fact-
nding phase of the trial, with common law on the one hand and civil law
on the other. In the economic literature, inquisitorial has usually been
assimilated to a procedure where a disinterested investigator (e.g., a public
o¢ cial) is responsible for discovery, as opposed to the adversarial method
where the parties have full control over the uncovering and presentation of
evidence (see Shin 1998, Dewatripont and Tirole 1999, Froeb and Kobayashi
2001, Palumbo 2001).18 However, as far as civil litigation is concerned and by
contrast with criminal trials, the presentation of proof is mainly the parties
responsibility even in the civil law system.
While the civil law judge may investigate facts on his own initiative (e.g.,
through court-appointed experts), the main practical di¤erence is the judges
greater direct involvement in guiding the litigants submission of evidence
through bench request, questions and suggestions (Parisi, 2002, provides a
short comparative description). This is not unlike managerial judging in
the US discovery process, in the sense that it may focus discovery (and pre-
vent excesses, see Schrag 1999), but it does also allow the use of hints or
threats, implicit or explicit, as to how the judge will adjudicate on the basis
of the evidence presented so far. If the extent of the partiesinformation is
unveriable, such threats may be the only means available to elicit disclosure.
Our analysis provides a rationale for a procedure with an active judge.19
18One exception is Block and Parkers (2004) experimental study of the e¢ ciency of
adjudication with a passive referre as opposed to an active one who is the only ques-
tioner permitted. They interpret their ndings as suggesting the need for burden of proof
guidelines in the purely adversarial procedure.
19Actual systems range on a scale from the theoretically pure adversarial to the theoret-
ically pure inquisitorial (see Jolowicz, 2000, 2003). For instance, article 32.1 of England
new Civil Procedure Rules allows the court much power in controlling evidence. Sim-
ilarly, under Rule 614(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, U.S. federal courts may in
principle interrogate and even call witnesses, although in practice this is unusual. On the
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Our results would be a¤ected if society is also concerned with the costs of
presenting evidence. Bernardo, Talley and Welch (2000) analyzed the trade-
o¤ between deterrence and litigation costs (see also Rubinfeld and Sapping-
ton, 1987). A similar concern in our model would seem to justify a more
stringent standard of proof than preponderance. This would yield less de-
terrence but would also reduce the frequency of suits, and thereby litigation
costs, by making it more di¢ cult for a plainti¤ to prevail. A concern for
costs would also impact on the allocation of the burden of proof if parties
di¤er in the cost of presenting the additional evidence, i.e., there would
now be a tendency to put the burden on the cheaper information provider
(see Hay and Spier, 1997), although taking into account the likelihood that
the litigants have access to evidence. This would a¤ect disclosure, hence
deterrence.
However, changes in the standard of proof and in the allocation of the
burden of proof interact in complex ways. Allocating the burden of proof to
the defendant because he is the cheaper information provider could stimulate
suits. Moreover, if the defendant is allocated the burden of proof for cost
reasons, must he meet the same higher standard of proof to discharge it,
which would also stimulate suits? Whether reasonably simple general rules
of proof can be obtained in this context is doubtful but merits future research.
We abstracted from many other relevant considerations. For instance,
our litigants were endowed with hard evidence. Their strategies would be
di¤erent if they had to invest to uncover evidence. How does this impact on
the e¢ cient standard of proof and burden assignment? We also abstracted
from the possibility of out-of-court settlements. Again, this is an avenue for
future research.
other hand, judicial or statutory decisions in most U.S. states have explicitly restricted
the judges power to comment on the evidence.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 2: We rst justify the expression for ej(y) in (2).
Let Z+(y)  Z(y) be the set of zs such that  (y; z) >  (y; ). Similarly,
let Z (y)  Z(y) be the set of zs such that  (y; z) <  (y; ). An informed
plainti¤ submits z only if z 2 Z+(y); an informed defendant submits z only
if z 2 Z (y). Then
ej(y) =
0@1  v X
z2Z+(y)
pj(z jy)  u
X
z2Z (y)
pj(z jy)
1A (y; )
+ v
X
z2Z+(y)
pj(z jy) (y; z) + u
X
z2Z (y)
pj(z jy) (y; z): (11)
To see this, note that the expression in the right-hand side parenthesis
equals0@1  X
z2Z+(y)
pj(z jy) 
X
z2Z (y)
pj(z jy)
1A
+(1  v)
X
z2Z+(y)
pj(z j y) + (1  u)
X
z2Z (y)
pj(z jy):
This is the probability that additional evidence will not change the prob-
ability of liability compared to  (y; ), plus the probability that it would
have but the interested party was uninformed. Hence, it is the probability of
no change. The second term in (11) is the probability that the plainti¤ is
informed times the expected probability of liability for z 2 Z+(y). A similar
interpretation holds for the third term.
Expression (11) can be rewritten as
ej(y) =  (y; ) + v
X
z2Z+(y)
pj(z jy) (y; z) [ (y; z)   (y; )]
 u
X
z2Z (y)
pj(z jy) [ (y; )   (y; z)] ;
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which explains (2).
The optimal  maximizes deterrence dened as
 =
X
y2Y
[pl(y)el(y)  ph(y)eh(y)]
=
X
y2Y
[pl(y)  ph(y)] (y; )
+
X
y2Y
X
z2Z(y)
[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)](y; z); (12)
where we substituted for ej(y) from (2) and where
(y; z) = vmax[0;  (y; z)   (y; )]  umax[0;  (y; )   (y; z)]: (13)
The second term in (12) is maximized if (y; z) is as large as possible
when pl(y; z) > ph(y; z) and as small as possible when pl(y; z) < ph(y; z).
Taking  (y; ) as given, this implies
 (y; z) =
(
1 when pl(y; z) > ph(y; z);
0 when pl(y; z) < ph(y; z):
Thus,  (y; z) =  (y; z) for z 2 Z(y), which proves the rst claim in the
proposition. Substituting this result in (13) and from the latter in (12) yields
 =
X
y2Y
[pl(y)  ph(y)] (y; )
+
X
y2Y
X
z2Z(y)
[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)]v (y; z)(1   (y; ))
 
X
y2Y
X
z2Z(y)
[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)]u(1   (y; z)) (y; )
= v
X
y2Y
X
z2Z(y)
[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)] (y; z)
+
X
y2Y
[pl(y)Ql(y)  ph(y)Qh(y)] (y; ); (14)
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where
Qj(y) = 1  v
X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)pj(z jy)  u
X
z2Z(y)
[1   (y; z)]pj(z jy)
or equivalently
Qj(y) = (1  v)(1  u) + (1  u)v
X
z2Z(y)
[1   (y; z)]pj(z jy)
+ (1  v)u
X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)pj(z jy):
Choosing  (y; ) to maximize the second term in (14) implies
 (y; ) =
(
1 when pl(y)Ql(y) > ph(y)Qh(y);
0 when pl(y)Ql(y) < ph(y)Qh(y);
thereby proving the second claim.
Proof of corollary 2: The optimal scheme assigns liability according to
the sign of
(y) := pl(y)Ql(y)  ph(y)Qh(y) = (1  v)+(y) + (1  u) (y) (15)
where
+(y) :=
X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)] > 0; (16)
 (y) :=
X
z2Z(y)
[1   (y; z)][pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)]  0; (17)
and where the sign follows from proposition 2 and the assumption that y is
mixed. To prove the rst part of the corollary, recall that the burden is on
the defendant if (y) > 0. Now, (y) > 0 when v < u = 1. By continuity, it
follows that there exists uc 2 (v; 1) such that (y) > 0 if u  uc. The proof
of the second part is similar provided  (y) < 0, which obtains if there exists
z 2 Z(y) such that pl(y; z) < ph(y; z).
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Proof of proposition 3: We complete the argument in the text by specify-
ing out-of-equilibrium beliefs. These are non trivial only when the evidence
is incomplete and such that  (y; ) = 0, which can only result from the
plainti¤ deviating from his equilibrium strategy (the defendants equilibrium
strategy is to remain passive when such a y is submitted). There are three
possibilities: the plainti¤ was uninformed but nevertheless sued on the basis
of y alone; he was informed, but  (y; z) = 0 and he nevertheless sued, dis-
closing only y; he was informed and  (y; z) = 1, hence he should have sued
as prescribed by the equilibrium but then forgot to also submit z. Out-
of-equilibrium beliefs sustain the equilibrium if they put a su¢ ciently small
weight on the third possibility. For instance, put zero weight on the third
possibility and an equal weight on the rst two with, say, an " probability of
mistake on the part of the plainti¤. The probability of (y; ), conditional on
the care level, is then
sj  pj(y)
241  v + v X
z2Z(y)
(1   (y; z)) pj(z j y)
35 "
= pj(y)
24Qj(y) + u X
z2Z(y)
(1   (y; z)) pj(z j y)
35 "; j = h; l:
Hence,
sl   sh
"
= [pl(y)Ql(y)  ph(y)Qh(y)]
+u
X
z2Z(y)
(1   (y; z)) [pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)]  0:
By proposition 2, the expression in the rst bracket is nonpositive when
 (y; ) = 0. By proposition 1, the second term on the right-hand-side is also
non positive. Thus, the defendant is not held liable under the preponderance
standard, as required to sustain the equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 4: By proposition 3, d(y; ) =  (y; ) is part of an
equilibrium. We show that d(y; ) = 1 is also part of an equilibrium when
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 (y; ) = 0, provided u or v are su¢ ciently large. A similar argument would
show that d(y; ) = 0 is part of an equilibrium when  (y; ) = 1.
By proposition 2,  (y; ) = 0 if pl(y)Ql(y)  ph(y)Qh(y) or equivalently
(u  v)
X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)]  (1  u) [ph(y)  pl(y)] : (18)
From the discussion in the text and using (9), the strategy d(y; ) = 1 is
part of an equilibrium if
pl(y)
241  u+ u X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)pl(z j y)
35 >
ph(y)
241  u+ u X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)ph(z j y)
35
or equivalently
u
X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)] > (1  u) [ph(y)  pl(y)] : (19)
If y is mixed,X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)] > max [0; pl(y)  ph(y)] : (20)
a) Suppose ph(y) > pl(y). Given (20), the summations on the left-hand
side of (18) and (19) are strictly positive. Inequality (19) holds for u suf-
ciently large, say u > u0, where u0 equalizes the left and right-hand side
of (19). Inequality (18) holds if v is su¢ ciently large, say v  v0(u) where
v0(u) < u equalizes the left and right-hand side of (18). Hence, u > u0
and v  v0(u) imply that d(y; ) = 1 is part of an equilibrium, while
d(y; ) =  (y; ) = 0 is part of another.
b) Suppose ph(y)  pl(y). Given (20), inequality (19) then holds for
any u. We show that inequality (18) holds if v is su¢ ciently large. To see
this, multiply both sides of (20) by u  1, yielding
(u  1)
X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)] < (1  u) [ph(y)  pl(y)] :
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This means that (18) holds for v = 1. By continuity, there exists v0(u) 2 (u; 1)
such that (18) holds if v  v0(u). Thus, there are multiple equilibria if v is
su¢ ciently large.
Proof of proposition 5: That d(y; z) =  (y; z) for z 2 Z(y) follows
directly from the rules of proof. If y is conclusive, the judges best move is
obviously b(y) =  (y; ) so we consider only instances where y is mixed.
Conditional on the care level j, the probability of being at the informa-
tion set suit and evidence y is pj(y)(y), where (y) is the conditional
probability, over all the plainti¤s types, that a suit is led. This depends on
the equilibrium, but in any case (y) > 0 when y is mixed (even if he cannot
win on the basis of y alone, a plainti¤ has a probability v > 0 of assessing
favorable additional evidence). At the information set suit and evidence
y, using the normative priors, the judges up-dated beliefs about j are
therefore
 (j j y) = (
1
2
)pj(y)(y)
(1
2
)ph(y)(y) + (
1
2
)pl(y)(y)
=
pj(y)
ph(y) + pl(y)
; j = h; l: (21)
If b = 1 is announced, the partiesdominant strategies are for the plainti¤
not to disclose additional evidence and for the defendant to disclose evidence
if informed and the evidence is favorable. The reverse holds if b = 0 is
announced. Given d(y; z) =  (y; z) for z 2 Z(y), the judges expected
payo¤ from b = 1 is therefore
(1; y) =  (h j y)
24u X
z2Z(y)
(1   (y; z)) ph(z j y)
35
+ (l j y)
241  u+ u X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)pl(z j y)
35 :
The rst square bracket is the probability of decision d = 0 when j = h.
The second bracket is the probability of d = 1 when j = l. Similarly, the
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expected payo¤ from b = 0 is
(0; y) =  (h j y)
241  v + v X
z2Z(y)
(1   (y; z))ph(z j y)
35
+ (l j y)
24v X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)pl(z j y)
35 :
The judge chooses b = 1 if
(1; y)  (0; y) =  (l j y)
241  u+ (u  v) X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)pl(z j y)
35
  (h j y)
241  u+ (u  v) X
z2Z(y)
 (y; z)ph(z j y)
35
=  (l j y)Ql(y)   (h j y)Qh(y) > 0;
where use has been made of (10). Substituting from (21), (1; y) > (0; y) if
pl(y)Ql(y) > ph(y)Qh(y):
Recalling proposition 2, this proves b(y) =  (y; ).
Proof of lemma 2: If y is conclusive, the only credible announcement
under the rules of proof is b(y) =  (y; ). We therefore consider the self-
signalling condition only for the cases where y is mixed. Let (b; b0 j y) be the
judges expected payo¤ when he announces d(y; ) = b0, which the parties
are assumed to believe, although the judge knows he will play d(y; ) = b
where the play of b is taken as exogenous. Announcements are self-signalling
if (b; b j y)  (b; b0 j y) for all b, b0 2 f0; 1g, b 6= b0.
Denoting by d 2 f0; 1g the actual decision at the close of the trial,
(b; b0 j y) = (h j y) Pr (d = 0 j b; b0; y; h) + (l j y) Pr (d = 1 j b; b0; y; l) ;
(22)
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where the  (j j y)s are the judges beliefs about the defendants care level,
as dened in (21), and where the conditional probabilities Pr ( j b; b0; y; j)
are determined by the continuation game.
When the complete evidence is disclosed, the sequentially optimal action
under the rules of proof is d(y; z) =  (y; z). Since y is mixed,X
z2Z(y)
[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)] (y; z) > 0 (23)
and X
z2Z(y)
[pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)] [1   (y; z)]  0: (24)
Given the belief that the judge will adjudicate according to b0, the par-
ties have dominant disclosure strategies, the argument being the same as in
the proof of proposition 5. Combining this with the judges actual play of
d(y; ) = b and his sequentially optimal decision when the complete evidence
is disclosed, we obtain
Pr (d = 1 j b; b0; y; j) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if b = 0, b0 = 1;
1 if b = 1, b0 = 0;
v
P
z2Z(y) pj(z j y) (y; z) if b = b0 = 0;
1  uPz2Z(y) pj(z j y) [1   (y; z)] if b = b0 = 1.
Consider the rst line. When b0 = 1, the plainti¤ discloses nothing, the
defendant discloses only favorable evidence (if he can). Thus, disclosure of
the complete evidence can only lead to d = 0. If no additional evidence is
disclosed, the judge carries out his plan to play d(y; ) = b = 0. It follows
that the outcome is d = 0 for sure. The argument for the other lines is
similar.
Substituting in (22) yields
(0; 1 j y) = (h j y);
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(0; 0 j y) = (h j y)[1  v
X
z2Z(y)
ph(z j y) (y; z)]
+(l j y)v
X
z2Z(y)
pl(z j y) (y; z);
and therefore
(0; 0 j y)  (0; 1 j y) = v
X
z2Z(y)
[(l j y)pl(z j y)  (h j y)ph(z j y)] (y; z):
Substituting for the  (j j y)s from (21) nally yields
(0; 0 j y)  (0; 1 j y) = v
X
z2Z(y)

pl(y; z)  ph(y; z)
ph(y) + pl(y)

 (y; z) > 0;
where the sign follows from (23).
Using (24), a similar argument shows that
(1; 1 j y)  (1; 0 j y) = u
X
z2Z(y)

ph(y; z)  pl(y; z)
ph(y) + pl(y)

[1   (y; z)]  0;
completing the proof.
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